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ESSAY
PLAINTIPHOBIA IN THE SUPREME COURT
Theodore Eisenberg † & Kevin M. Clermont††
Through the years, debate has raged over whether the Supreme Court’s
summary judgment trilogy and Twombly-Iqbal pleading decisions had sig-
nificant practical effects.  To address that question, this Article introduces a
new empirical measure: the difference between the pretrial-adjudication judg-
ment rates for the defendant and for the plaintiff.  Plotting that difference
over time suggests that the cases on summary judgment and pleading, which
were far and away the two most major alterations of pretrial disposition dur-
ing the last four decades or more, had a markedly anti-plaintiff impact.
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INTRODUCTION
The ballyhooed Supreme Court cases on summary judgment and
on pleading had palpably negative effects on plaintiffs.  That state-
ment of our thesis is perhaps deflating.  After all, if the Court’s anti-
plaintiff signals on matters of general procedural import did not have
anti-plaintiff effects, the jobs of legal academics would have no point.
That is, if the summary judgment trilogy1 and Twombly-Iqbal2 did not
† Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell University.  We wanted to thank Joe
Cecil of the Federal Judicial Center for his comments and cooperation.
†† Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University.  This is my seventeenth, and last, article
coauthored with Ted.  He tragically died on February 23, 2014, of a heart attack while
skiing.  I will so miss my brilliant and inspiring friend.
1 The trilogy clarified the law on summary judgment, while appearing to encourage
the granting of such motions. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986).
2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (May 21, 2007) (dismissing an anti-
trust complaint that alleged an agreement in conclusory terms based upon information
193
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help defendants and hurt plaintiffs, then changes in law are empty
pronouncements not worth studying.
Rescuing our thesis from what some might see as blinding obvi-
ousness is the claim to the contrary by a few influential empiricists that
these cases had negligible real-world effects, or at least that any effects
do not show up in the data.3  We shall try to show that their studies,
which are perfectly fine studies, were not addressing the question that
most readers think they were addressing.  The always valuable lesson is
that empirical studies demand careful reading.  If one gives those
nonintuitive studies that reading, and then seeks out better empirical
proof, the truth survives that anti-plaintiff pronouncements induce
observable anti-plaintiff effects, just as one would expect.
I
JUDICIALLY TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD
Let us begin with our basic result, summarized in Figure 1.  To
reach the result, we used the comprehensive data set from the Admin-
istrative Office (AO) of the United States Courts4 for all district court
and belief, with the lack of detail owing to the fact that the plaintiffs had no proof in hand
without discovery); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (May 18, 2009) (clarifying the
broad applicability of Twombly and the intricate workings of the new plausibility test).
3 On motions to dismiss, see JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 21–23 (FJC Mar. 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS I];
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 5 (FJC Nov. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniq
bal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf [hereinafter FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS II].  On summary
judgment, see Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 906 (2007) [hereinafter Cecil, Summary Judg-
ment I] (results also reported in JOE S. CECIL ET AL., TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRAC-
TICE: 1975–2000, at 20–26 (FJC 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/look
up/trsjpr07.pdf/$file/trsjpr07.pdf); Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort to Judge
Michael Baylson, Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in
Local Rules (Aug. 13, 2008), available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sujulrs2
.pdf [hereinafter Cecil, Summary Judgment II].
4 The data were gathered by the Administrative Office, assembled by the Federal
Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and So-
cial Research. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 94, 94 (1996).  These data convey details of all cases terminated in the federal
courts since fiscal year 1970.  When any civil case terminates in a federal district court or
court of appeals, the court clerk transmits to the AO information about the case, including
the names of the parties, the subject matter category (chosen from about a hundred cate-
gories, including specific branches of contract, tort, and other areas of law) and the juris-
dictional basis of the case, the case’s origin in the district as original or removed or
transferred, the amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination in the district court
or the court of appeals, the procedural stage of the case at termination, the procedural
method of disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached decision, the prevail-
ing party and the relief granted.  Thus, the computerized database, compiled from this
information, contains all of the millions of federal civil cases over many years from the
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civil cases.5  We report the data from 1979, when the AO started cod-
ing the outcome as judgment for plaintiff or for defendant, through
September 2013.
The graph shows the difference between the calendar year’s
pretrial-adjudication judgment rates for the defendant and for the
plaintiff, where the rate is the ratio of the number of terminations that
are judgments for the defendant or the plaintiff by pretrial adjudica-
tion6 divided by the number of terminations in all cases that are ini-
tially contested but do not eventually go to trial.7  The graph thereby
represents the relative advantage of the defendant over the plaintiff in
getting a definitive pretrial adjudication.  Importance lies not in the
height of any line, given that one would expect defendants to obtain
more pretrial-adjudication judgments than plaintiffs.  Instead, the im-
portant observations lie in changes in the height, which would reflect
changes in advantage.
whole country. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 COR-
NELL L. REV. 119, 127–29 (2002) (more fully describing this database and its strengths and
weaknesses).  For the latest verification of the AO coding, see Matthew Sag, Empirical Stud-
ies of Copyright Litigation: Nature of Suit Coding 4–6 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2330256.
5 We dropped duplicate cases.  The AO data include information more than once
about many cases.  So we reduced to one observation those cases that were filed in the
same district on the same day and later terminated in that district on the same day and that
had the same case category, jurisdictional basis, disposition method, procedural stage at
termination, and outcome.
6 We define pretrial adjudication as the AO’s method-of-disposition codes 6, 15, 17,
19, and 20, plus disposition code 3 for 1991 and later (code 3 switched in usage around FY
1991 from voluntary dismissal to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). See Kevin M. Clermont,
Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1954 n.180 (2009).  Code 6, which
primarily comprises dispositions by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, dwarfs the
other pretrial codes.
The AO disposition codes are: 0=Transfer/remand: transfer to another district;
1=Transfer/remand: remanded to state court; 2=Dismissals: want of prosecution; 3=Dismis-
sals: lack of jurisdiction; 4=Judgment on: default; 5=Judgment on: consent; 6=Judgment
on: motion before trial; 7=Judgment on: jury verdict; 8=Judgment on: directed verdict;
9=Judgment on: court trial; 10=Transfer/remand: multidistrict litigation; 11=Transfer/re-
mand: remanded to U.S. agency; 12=Dismissals: voluntarily; 13=Dismissals: settled; 14=Dis-
missals: other; 15=Judgment on: award of arbitrator; 16=Judgment on: stayed pending
bankruptcy; 17=Judgment on: other; 18=Judgment on: statistical closing; 19=Judgment on:
appeal affirmed (magistrate judge); 20=Judgment on: appeal denied (magistrate judge).
See INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, STUDY NO. 33622, FEDERAL
COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE 21–22 (2011).  Because of the AO’s changing codes
and splitting off new codes from time to time, one must be careful in handling disposition
codes.  Here the most suspicious event was the increases in new disposition code 17 around
1986.  But when we recreated Figure 1 without including code 17, the picture did not
substantially change.
7 That is, from the denominator we excluded all default cases, for which the disposi-
tion code is 4, thus treating them as being initially uncontested.  We also excluded all tried
cases, defined as disposition codes 7, 8, and 9.
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FIGURE 1. DEFENDANT PRETRIAL-ADJUDICATION JUDGMENT RATE
MINUS PLAINTIFF RATE, OVER TIME































For “all categories,”8 we are graphing 517,437 pretrial-adjudica-
tion judgments for defendant, 236,993 pretrial-adjudication judg-
ments for plaintiff, and 5,199,366 nondefault nontrial terminations
over the thirty-five years.  The shape of the all-categories line shows a
tilting of the playing field in the defendants’ favor by the 1986 sum-
mary judgment trilogy, which accelerated some recent upswings in
summary judgment activity.9  Then, the Court more unexpectedly and
suddenly retilted the field in Twiqbal.  In the means recorded for cases
terminated in 2008, Twombly already showed its effect, as the opinion’s
attitude perhaps resonated with the lower courts’ preexisting but
pent-up predilections for more rigorous gatekeeping.10  In the cases
terminated in 2009, Iqbal added a mid-year boost.  The relative advan-
tage of the defendants kicked in more quickly for the pleading deci-
8 We did, however, exclude prisoner cases, which are the six category codes in the
range of 510–555, because those cases are numerous and distinctive in many ways.  Includ-
ing them would not much change the shape of the all-categories line in Figure 1 but would
shift it considerably higher, near to the lines for civil rights cases.  Indeed, prisoner cases
alone show the same pattern, with a very pronounced Twiqbal effect.  See also Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring Iqbal 25–26 (Oct. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (showing an intense effect of Twiqbal on prisoner cases).  Including prisoner cases
would thus have fortified our conclusions.
9 See infra note 22 and accompanying text. R
10 See infra note 43. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 5 26-NOV-14 14:49
2014] PLAINTIPHOBIA IN THE SUPREME COURT 197
sions than for the summary judgment decisions because summary
judgment requires more case development.
The summary judgment and pleading upticks in defendants’ ad-
vantage faded in the data over time because plaintiffs adjusted by pur-
suing stronger cases, that is, cases that could pass the new tests
imposed by the Court.  Plaintiffs would not file some cases and would
settle others on less favorable terms.11  In other words, the selection
effect eventually managed to erase most of the pro-defendant deci-
sions’ effects appearing in the data, but the process was slow.12  Of
course, the decisions’ anti-plaintiff effects in the real world persisted
as the plaintiffs could survive the new legal standards only with
stronger cases.
The graph thus reflects the invigoration of summary judgment
and pleading testing, which were far and away the two most important
alterations of pretrial disposition during at least the last four de-
cades.13  A similar pattern appears in particular case categories such as
constitutional tort, employment, and contract cases.14  But the de-
fendants’ relative advantage is much bigger in those civil rights cases,
and the impact of the Court’s decisions more pronounced, than in
contract cases.  In contract cases, the plaintiffs are less stereotypical,
and the plaintiff and defendant roles can even be interchangeable.
So the contrast among categories drives home that the Court’s deci-
sions were putting the stereotypical plaintiff at a disadvantage.
Some of our observed effects could, of course, be owing to factors
other than the Court’s decisions.  A lot more was going on in this
11 See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 145–46 (2009).
12 In support of this point, filings do not immediately fall off in response to Twiqbal.
Even in the heavily impacted civil rights categories, and even for pro se cases, filings do not
fall off until 2012.  It is possible that the increase in the defendants’ motions might have
come sooner, but signs exist that defendants too were slow to react. Cf. Jill Curry & Mat-
thew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File?  A Study Comparing Removal
Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 872 (2013) (finding tentatively no increase in the
rate of removal from notice-pleading states over 2005 to 2009).
13 Logit regression analysis of defendant’s getting judgment by pretrial adjudication
(controlling for pro se status, circuit, and district) shows the two upticks to be significant at
the .01 level.  The same basic pattern prevails in all the circuits, except the Third Circuit
lacks an uptick in 2008.  Perhaps the Third Circuit courts had anticipated Twombly. See
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 577 (2002) (describing
the Third Circuit as the “recognized leader” in the application of heightened pleading).
But even the Third Circuit shows the uptick in civil rights cases.  Shifting to a district-level
analysis, the anti-plaintiff effect predominated among the districts in the period after the
trilogy and was especially widespread in the 2007–2010 period.
14 These three categories are, respectively, category codes 440 (“Other Civil Rights”);
442 (“Jobs”), plus 445 (“ADA-Employment”), which was separated out from 442 beginning
in FY 2005; and 190 (“Other Contract Actions”). See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 103, 104 n.4 (2009).
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country over this long period.  But what are the other candidates for
explaining Figure 1?  One might be the recent economic downturn,
which changed the mix of cases in federal courts.  But an economic-
downturn explanation would have some trouble, for example, with
the fact that the Twiqbal uptick seems to have skipped contract cases.
We do admit that for constitutional tort and employment cases,
the tilt in the calendar year of 2008 supports our point too well, being
almost too soon and extreme to be believed.  Still, our graph is plot-
ting the means for a whole calendar year that begins more than seven
months after the Twombly decision, and the stretched y-axis scale does
magnify the uptick.  Moreover, these civil rights case categories collect
the plaintiffs most susceptible to being picked off by defendants with a
new weapon.15  In any event, we are claiming not that the effect shown
in our graph was exclusively the product of Twombly, but only that
Twombly contributed to the effect.  We shall argue principally that in-
ferring an impact from the Court’s key procedural decisions is
sounder than accepting the conclusion of no impact pushed by some
empirical studies.  The data do not support an absence of effect.
A. Summary Judgment
Almost the entire academic community, including not only those
who criticized the Court’s summary judgment trilogy as an unwar-
ranted expansion of the device,16 but also those who saw the trilogy as
a helpful clarification of doctrine,17 expected the decisions to have an
impact.  Decades later, however, Joe Cecil and his colleagues at the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) released the premier study of summary
judgment.18  Its primary message was that the trilogy had at most a
small effect in the real world, as it concluded that “we found few
changes in summary judgment activity after the Supreme Court
trilogy.”19
That study looked at a sample of docket sheets from six districts
in federal civil cases (excluding prisoner, Social Security, and benefit
repayment cases) terminated during six twelve-month periods from
15 As we shall show, pro se cases also contributed much to the uptick. See infra note 44 R
and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 192
(1988) (criticizing Matsushita and Liberty Lobby).
17 See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 787 (1988) (noting that the trilogy has
“refocussed attention on summary judgment and has made a start on providing a logical
framework for deciding how and when it can be used”).
18 Cecil, Summary Judgment I, supra note 3, at 863.  A later study showed that variations R
in local rules on summary judgment practice had little effect.  Cecil, Summary Judgment II,
supra note 3, at 1–3.
19 Cecil, Summary Judgment I, supra note 3, at 906. R
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1975 to 2000.20  While emphasizing that summary judgment practice
varies considerably with locale and case type,21 it found overall that
the percentage of cases involving one or more summary judgment
motions increased from 12% in fiscal year 1975 to 20% in calendar
year 2000; the court granted such a motion in full or in part in 6%
and 12% of all cases in the respective year’s sample; and grant of sum-
mary judgment resulted in termination of 3.7% and 7.8% of all cases
in the respective year’s sample.22  The study suggested that the in-
creasing ascendancy of summary judgment dated from the upswing in
the late 1970s of judicial case management with an emphasis on mo-
tion practice, rather than from the trilogy.23  But it found that the
increase began leveling off after 1988.24  Meanwhile, among all the
summary judgment motions over the study’s whole time period,
viewed on a motion level rather than on a case level, 72% were mo-
tions by defendants (the rate of granting in full or in part going up
and down without a consistent time trend, ending up at 49% in 2000),
while 28% were plaintiffs’ motions (with an analogous win rate, end-
ing up at 36% in 2000).25  This picture of the studied time period, in
sum, exhibited a somewhat erratically increasing number of summary
judgment motions, which steadily were motions in the main by de-
fendants who enjoyed a higher win rate.26
The Cecil study’s data are consistent with our data.  True, its six
districts may not be representative of the nation as a whole at which
we look;27 its data show results for six separated periods (1975, 1986,
1988, 1989, 1995, and 2000), thereby masking the ebbs and flows that
we see; and it examines summary judgment motions only, while we are
looking at all pretrial adjudications.  Still, if we combine its result of
20 Id. at 861.
21 There are serious district- and category-specific differences here. See Clermont,
supra note 6, at 1944 n.141; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment R
Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large
Federal Districts, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 2008, at 1, 26–30 (Kuo-Chang
Huang ed., 2009).
22 Cecil, Summary Judgment I, supra note 3, at 883.  There is reason to suspect that the R
Cecil study overstated the increase in the rate of summary judgment terminations over this
time period. See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 21, at 9–11, 24–26. R
23 Cecil, Summary Judgment I, supra note 3, at 904. R
24 Id. at 892.
25 Id. at 886–88.
26 Id.
27 If we run our measure on the AO data for 1979–2013, but use only Cecil’s selection
of districts and categories, the results look like our Figure 1 except that 1988 and 1989
show up as having a lower gain in defendants’ relative advantage.  In fact, Cecil’s article
revealed a strong uptick in plaintiffs’ win rate relative to defendants’ win rate for those
years in his six districts, which would produce the observed temporary downturn in the
defendants’ advantage just in those districts. Id. at 886, 888.  Thus, Cecil’s article can say
that the parties’ relative win rates do not change much over the years, but that is true only
because its sample of cases peculiarly denied defendants a bump right after the trilogy.
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increasing motions over the years 1975–1988, with its observed varia-
tions in plaintiff and defendant win rates over 1975–2000, we get our
graph.  First, an increasing numbers of motions, in the main by de-
fendants who enjoy a higher win rate, will augment the defendants’
relative advantage over the years.  Second, the selection effect could
mean that plaintiffs eventually began pursuing stronger cases, produc-
ing a leveling or descending line that masks a loss in the plaintiffs’
true position.  Third, even if the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ win rates
each show no consistent time trend over the studied period, their win
rates over time can change relatively so as to produce our graph.
Based on consistent data, then, the Cecil study primarily stressed
a long-term increase in summary judgment activity, while we go on to
stress a tilt in favor of defendants in 1986.  The lesson is that the Cecil
study’s story is accurate, but incomplete.  It can say that the trilogy
itself had little effect on the increasing number of motions over the
longer term, without undermining our conclusion that the trilogy af-
fected the parties’ relative positions.  Our data thus can and do show
that the parties’ relative positions shifted after the 1986 trilogy to the
plaintiffs’ disadvantage.
B. Pleading
The recent years’ headline event for civil procedure was the
Twiqbal tandem on pleading.  The great majority of academics la-
mented what they saw as an unjustifiable revolution.28  But some de-
fended the two decisions as a beneficial policy change in the pursuit
of efficiency—or even as a pronouncement representing no real doc-
trinal or practical change, with a few backing up their position by say-
ing that they could empirically show the real-world effects to have
been inconsequential.29  Most prominently among the latter, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center reported that the Court’s cases had no discernible
effect on outcomes.30
The FJC’s studies looked at the electronic records in federal civil
cases (excluding prisoner and pro se cases) from twenty-three of the
busiest districts dispersed across the country in search of motions filed
28 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Sys-
tems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (criticizing the new regime); Kevin M. Clermont,
Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2010) (exploring
the new regime).
29 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal
Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1725–28 (2013) (discussing empirical defenders, after
categorizing Twiqbal defenders); see also id. at 1714–25 (rebutting the view that Twiqbal
changed nothing doctrinally).
30 See FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS I, supra note 3, at 21–23.  A later study confirmed the R
FJC’s earlier results; after separating out the increasingly frequent grants with leave to
amend and tracking down what later happened in those cases, the researchers were able to
say that the dismissal rate stayed steady.  FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS II, supra note 3, at 4. R
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promptly, or decided, during two sets of multi-month periods around
2006 and 2010.31  Not unlike the summary judgment study, the FJC’s
new studies showed, on a case level, a substantially increased number
of defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the per-
centage of cases that involved one or more such motions having shot
up by more than half from 4.0% in 2006 to 6.2% in 2010.32  After
some manipulation of the data, the studies showed, on a motion level,
no statistically significant change in the rate of granting dismissal or in
the rate of giving grants that terminated the case.33
That finding of more or less steady dismissal rates—in a study
with a narrow time focus on a purely defensive weapon, prepared dur-
ing intense controversy over Twiqbal—has generated an inference that
goes beyond the summary judgment discussion and that marks the
spot where the pleading debate goes off the tracks: the inference be-
ing that plaintiffs were not hurt by Twiqbal.  But that inference is sim-
ply implausible.  The Court’s decisions aimed at kicking some
plaintiffs out of court.  Major anti-plaintiff signals of general procedu-
ral import emanating from the nation’s highest court should have
some effect.  It could be that judicial output data would show little or
no impact because of the selection effect, with the affected plaintiffs
never filing or quickly settling cases.  Still, an effect of hurting plain-
tiffs has to be out there.
One could counterargue that plaintiffs have always tended to
plead considerable detail, doing so in reaction to all the litigation
incentives to state a strong case; Twiqbal would thus have no impact on
31 FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS I, supra note 3, at 5; FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS II, supra note R
3, at 3. R
32 On the one hand, regressions indicated that the increase in motions actually was a
doubling. See FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS I, supra note 3, at 9–10.  On the other hand, the R
percentages for motions made might appear lower than what one would expect; but recall
that the denominator is a sample of all cases, not just cases in which a motion was a viable
possibility, and among all cases are many that terminate with little or no judicial involve-
ment. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN TWO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
8–9 (1989) (finding that the percentage of federal cases terminated in FY 1988 involving
one or more Rule 12(b)(6) motions was 13% of the sample supposedly drawn from all
docket sheets; the court decided such a motion in 10%, and granted it in 6%, of all cases in
the sample; and grant of the motion resulted in termination of 3% of the sample); cf. INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DIS-
TRICT COURTS 47–49 (2009) (finding that 15% of federal cases terminated in FY 2005 in-
volved one or more motions to dismiss of any kind, of which 54% were granted in whole or
part).
33 A report by the Administrative Office, based on its data covering all motions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and (c), supports an increasing number of motions
made, as well as a steady grant rate. STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS: INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/NOS-Motions%20Quarterly%
20December_031611.pdf.
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the majority of plaintiffs.34  That is obviously true.  For us, the interest-
ing question remains whether the data reveal that raising the pleading
standard negatively affects a certain subset of plaintiffs: those who
without discovery cannot plead enough detail to meet a new require-
ment that is applied subjectively on a preliminary record.
Just as for summary judgment, our pleading data are consistent
with the FJC’s data.  Again, the FJC’s story of increasing numbers of
motions, with a steady win rate, will by itself augment the defendants’
advantage.  And again, factors that the FJC did not consider would
produce our graph.
Although the FJC’s studies suggesting no effect are fine studies,
their story is incomplete on the defendants’ relative advantage after
Twiqbal.  The reason for incompleteness lies in the FJC’s focus on the
dismissal rate, which is the ratio of motions granted over motions
made.  Change in the rate of granting motions to dismiss constitutes a
measure of tangential and limited import.  It simply does not address
the question to which it may seem to imply an answer.  It will not
reveal the impact of Twiqbal.  Writers right from the beginning of the
Twiqbal era have questioned dismissal rate studies as telling us little of
relevance.35  Professor David Engstrom has since systematized the
questioning.36
Dismissal rate studies have plenty of problems, as evidenced by
the fact that they permit many researchers to find a change and a few
others to say no change,37 doing so perhaps in line with the result
desired.38  We can summarize the problems as falling into three major
groupings:
34 See, e.g., Jason A. Cantone, Joe S. Cecil & Dhairya Jani, Whither Notice Pleading?:
Pleading Practice in the Days Before Twombly 45–46 (Sept. 10, 2014), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=249440 (arguing that fact-heavy pleading has long been a common
practice); William H.J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement 24 (U. Chi.
Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 446, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2360723 (arguing that pleading rules have no great practical importance). But see
CORINA D. GERETY & BRITTANY K.T. KAUFFMAN, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE PROCESS: 2008–2013, at
4–5 (2014) (reporting attorney surveys that attest to an increase in the pleading of factual
detail).
35 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 28, at 839 n.66, 848 n.98; Clermont, supra note R
28, at 1366 n.140. R
36 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Proce-
dure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2013) (explaining the difficulties in gauging the size of
that impact on filed and unfiled cases—and in determining whether the benefit of head-
ing off unworthy plaintiffs outweighs the costs of the new pleading test).
37 See id. at 1204 n.7, 1231, 1245–48.
38 Compare Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on
12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 653 (2012) (“But let us not overlook the fact that
it was conceived by and completed at the direction of—although not directly performed
by—federal judges.  I respectfully suggest that in attempting to study what they themselves
are doing, they may not be completely impartial.”), and Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and
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• Ignored selection.  A big problem with dismissal rate studies is the
selection effect, which involves both cases not pursued by to-
day’s plaintiffs and additional motions now made by defend-
ants.  Plaintiffs not only will gather and plead more facts, but
also will sometimes choose not to pursue cases that would fall to
Twiqbal.  Defendants will make a lot more motions (and the
data support this happening).  In a perfect world for theory,
decisions like Twombly or Iqbal would have no effect on the
number of motions or the number of dismissals, leaving the dis-
missal rate unmoved as both plaintiffs and defendants immedi-
ately adjust to the new pleading regime.  In our imperfect
world, unfiled or settled cases by potential plaintiffs and more
motions by defendants still mean that one would not see a ma-
jor increase in the dismissal rate.  Thus, dismissal rate studies
can reveal judicial behavior in deciding an uncontrolled set of
motions, with little insight into the litigants’ behavior in re-
sponse to Twiqbal.  The most one can say about litigants’ behav-
ior is that upon any reasonable set of assumptions, the change
in dismissal rate will understate the effect of Twiqbal in raising
the pleading standard.
• Inaccurate measure.  Even if one were interested in the dismissal
rate among the motions selected for decision, the dismissal rate
is hard to measure.  Four traps hide in the dismissal rate’s nu-
merator (motions granted) and denominator (motions made),
each trap tripped in some but not all prior studies:
1. In the numerator, the researcher should focus on fatal
grants, ignoring grants made with the possibility of amend-
ment or better yet tracking down what happens in those
cases.  The real policy concern is not whether extra pleading
steps are necessary but whether Twiqbal has affected access
to justice.
2. The focus in the numerator should be on fatalities to the
plaintiff’s case, not merely particular claims knocked off.
Many cases get a trimming without denying relief to the
plaintiff.
3. In the denominator, the researcher should consider only
Twiqbal -like motions attacking the case’s factual sufficiency,
excluding the many motions to dismiss made on the basis of
legal insufficiency, various defenses, or other grounds.  The
Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that the FJC studies are “greatly, if unintentionally, mis-
leading”), with Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study:
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal 3 (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2026103 (reaffirming the argument that the studies are accurate).
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sea of all motions to dismiss will mask the true bite of
Twiqbal, which involves only those cases that would have suc-
ceeded under notice pleading but that now fail definitively
under the new regime.
4. Assembling the motions that make up the denominator re-
quires the effort of drawing a random sample from all cases
and not just reported cases, and then coding all features
needed to permit adequate covariate controls.  Many effects
that leap out at first glance do fall upon more rigorous
examination.
• Inappropriate question.  Even if one could untangle the selection
effect and accurately measure the dismissal rate, it would tell us
almost nothing that we want to know.  After all, the dismissal
rate is just a number that tells us how far the system departs, for
obscure reasons, from the equilibrium rate that selection effect
predicts in the abstract.  True, a sudden change in dismissal
rate might be informative.  But that change would still be dis-
tant from the real concern: What were the costs and benefits of
the Court’s imposing the Twiqbal pleading test?  Did any resul-
tant denial of access to justice plus the costs of administering
the new test outweigh the benefits of extinguishing weak cases
early in the litigation process?
II
ACADEMICALLY IMPROVING THE METHODOLOGY
A. Considering the Selection Effect
To untangle the selection effect, one would have to look at a sam-
ple of cases unfiled and filed, and either settled or adjudicated.  That
would let us see what cases that would have been pursued pre-Twiqbal
are no longer pursued.  Then one would have to segregate out from
the motions made those unrealistic ones that represent only the de-
fendants’ post-Twiqbal exuberance.  Then, the dismissal rate would let
us perceive the change in the pleading standard.
Moving forward from the impossibility of that program of re-
search, one could use some statistical technique like a matching study
to create pairs of very similar cases pre- and post-Twiqbal,39 or employ
post-stratification weighting that would weight more heavily those
cases post-Twiqbal that resemble the case mix pre-Twiqbal.40  The prob-
39 See Engstrom, supra note 36, at 1241–42 (proposing studies using the method).  For R
an example, see Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 56–64 (2009).
40 See R.J.A. Little, Post-Stratification: A Modeler’s Perspective, 88 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1001,
1002 (1993) (describing the method).
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lem then is that one needs to know a very great deal about the nature
and merits of each case.
Jonah Gelbach used a more practical method to account for the
selection effect.41  He calculated a rough correction term to add to
the observed change in the dismissal rate, yielding a minimum per-
centage of plaintiffs now facing a motion to dismiss who are hurt by
Twiqbal.42  The correction term, however, accounts mainly for the fact
that there are more motions to dismiss after Twiqbal, while accounting
for plaintiffs’ self-restraint would push the percentage of hurt plain-
tiffs above his minimum percentage.  Still, that correction term alone
converts the FJC’s observed change in dismissal rates into a considera-
bly bigger number.43
Our effort to account for the selection effect instead involves
looking at a measure other than the dismissal rate.  By looking at all
cases that go to judgment by pretrial adjudication over a long time
period, we minimize any effect of defendants’ changing their prefer-
ences from one pretrial vehicle to another.  Also, by comparing the
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ judgment rates, we manage to account
somewhat for the selection effect: we take off the table selection by
defendants, because the judgment rate is unaffected by any increase
in the rate of unsuccessful motions; and our graph conveys a sense of
magnitude for selection by plaintiffs, doing so by graphing our mea-
sure over time and showing the size of the defendants’ edge removed
41 Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly
and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2315–16 (2012) [hereinafter Gelbach
Note]; see Engstrom, supra note 36, at 1225–29, 1234 (discussing and recalculating R
Gelbach’s results); Jonah B. Gelbach, Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science Shed Light on the
Empirical Reality of Civil Procedure?, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 223 (2014) (defending his
approach).
42 Gelbach Note, supra note 41, at 2323. R
43 An alternative approach, which tries to neutralize the selection effect of nonfiling
(but not settlement), appears in William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Stan-
dards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 55–57 (2013).
Professor Hubbard uses selective AO data to show that the chance of dismissal (defined as
a very prompt decision, other than for plaintiff, within disposition code 6) in cases filed
before Twombly did not significantly rise for those dismissals coming after the Twombly opin-
ion.  However, many things affect the number of dismissals, so his result would be more
pertinent if he had looked at defendants’ success relative to plaintiffs’ success in disposi-
tion code 6 or otherwise controlled for trends in the number of dismissals.  In any event,
according to our calculations, his result depends on his choice to exclude the great mass of
dismissals that come more than 224 days after filing.  The exclusion was an understandable
effort to eliminate summary judgments, but that time frame seems unrealistically short for
motions to dismiss that are granted, in contrast to denied, especially in the period of some
uncertainty right after Twombly came down.  When we use his approach as to selecting data
and as to defining dismissal, but without that time constraint, there emerges a sizable in-
crease in dismissals for his cases filed just before and thus decided after the unanticipated
Twombly, a change significant at the .01 level.  Thus, his empirical approach delivers good
support for our thesis, and for the immediate and considerable impact of Twombly.
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as the plaintiffs come to react to new procedural barriers by selecting
stronger cases.
Admittedly, it remains arguable to what extent potential plaintiffs
choose not to pursue previously viable cases after the Supreme Court
raised barriers to the district court.  But going beyond Figure 1, our
measure does afford an additional way to assert that there is such an
effect.  We can do so by separately graphing pro se plaintiffs who go
against counseled defendants, although we can do so only beginning
in 1999, when the AO started coding for pro se status.  It turns out
that pro se cases contribute mightily to the Twombly effect.44
Figure 2 shows the pro se effect in two case categories heavily
impacted by Twiqbal.  The line for the pro se cases being higher
means that counseled defendants do better against pro se plaintiffs
than otherwise.  More to the point, looking beyond the line’s height,
we find telling the sharp uptick after Twombly.  It appears that Twombly
affected the cases with pro se plaintiffs against counseled defendants
even more heavily than the other cases in these case categories.  Fur-
thermore, those pro se plaintiffs showed a slower reaction to Twombly,
particularly in employment cases.  That is, those pro se plaintiffs act as
a control group that is comparatively immune to selection effect, be-
cause those plaintiffs more slowly adjust by ceasing to pursue some of
the cases that could not surmount the new barrier.45  Eventually, how-
ever, they join the ranks of potential plaintiffs who select only stronger
cases to pursue.
44 The FJC excluded cases with pro se parties from its studies, doing so on the suppo-
sition that Twiqbal does not apply to those cases. See FJC, MOTION TO DISMISS I, supra note
3, at 6 n.10.  That supposition rested on an overreading of Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 R
(2007) (per curiam). See Clermont, supra note 28, at 1368–70.  Our results show an impact R
on pro se cases, as does Reinert, supra note 8, at 23–29, in accordance with case holdings. R
See, e.g., Khor Chin Lim v. BMO Fin. Grp., 497 F. App’x 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Al-
though pro se complaints are construed liberally, Mr. Lim cannot escape the essential
requirement that he plead a claim that is ‘plausible on its face.’”).
45 Mixed effects logit regression analysis of defendant’s getting judgment by pretrial
adjudication in the cases filed during the year before or the year after the day of the
Twombly decision (controlling for circuit, for district by use of random intercepts, and for
changed docket load measured by each district’s change in mean time to disposition in the
year before and after Twombly) shows these upticks to be significant at the .01 level.  As the
focus shifts to pro se, the employment coefficient for a post-Twombly dummy variable goes
from .111 in 22,397 cases to .241 in the 5,225 different pro se cases, and constitutional tort
goes from .136 in 17,693 cases to .304 in the 10,076 different pro se cases.
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FIGURE 2. DEFENDANT PRETRIAL-ADJUDICATION JUDGMENT RATE
MINUS PLAINTIFF RATE, OVER TIME,
SEPARATING OUT PRO SE PLAINTIFFS AGAINST COUNSELED DEFENDANTS
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Again, other factors could be at work in producing the upticks,
like the economic downturn suddenly prompting weaker pro se cases.
But at least the graphs represent another piece of evidence of
Twombly’s impact.  Plaintiffs are no longer pursuing some of the cases
they would have pursued before that decision.
B. Constructing an Accurate Measure
A dismissal rate study could avoid the four traps in constructing
the measure, even if the selection effect still risks masking any observa-
ble effect on dismissal rate.  Professor Alex Reinert has recently tried
to do so.46  For his numerator, (1) he coded for dismissals with leave
to amend and followed those cases to learn the ultimate outcome, and
(2) he coded for partial grants and denials.47  For the denominator,
(3) he made the first real effort to narrow the focus to Twiqbal -like
motions that attack the case’s factual sufficiency, and (4) he sought
out, using PACER and not Westlaw or Lexis, all such contested mo-
46 Reinert, supra note 8, at 19–22. R
47 Id. at 20.
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tions decided during 2006 and 2010 in twelve of the FJC studies’
twenty-three districts (about 3,650 decisions, of which about 950 in-
volved pro se plaintiffs).48  The results, supported by regression analy-
sis, showed a significant jump after Twiqbal in dismissal rate from 42%
to 55% for counseled plaintiff cases, and from 75% to 87% in pro se
plaintiff cases.49
His are important results.  First, they confirm the majority of dis-
missal rate studies, which had found by less rigorous means a Twiqbal
effect of increasing the dismissal rate.50  Second, by addressing the
FJC studies in their own terms but coding with more detail, he man-
aged to refute them.  The FJC’s failure to detect a change in the dis-
missal rate apparently stemmed from its failure to burrow down to the
actual ground for deciding the motion to dismiss.51  Third, and most
important, he proved that Twiqbal raised the pleading standard, albeit
to an indeterminate degree.52  It is true that he failed to account for
the selection effect of party behavior.  But recall that the change in
dismissal rate will understate the Twiqbal impact on the pleading stan-
dard.  In other words, although a study showing no change in the dis-
missal rate would prove nothing, a study showing an increase in the
dismissal rate proves that Twiqbal raised the pleading standard.  Frus-
tratingly, though, a raised pleading standard does not prove unjusti-
fied detriment to plaintiffs.  It might mean no more than that Twiqbal
is achieving its aim of tossing unworthy plaintiffs.
By contrast, we come at the goal of constructing an accurate mea-
sure by switching to an alternative measure.  Our alternative measure
based on the rates of judgment by pretrial adjudication is certainly
still imperfect, but it improves on dismissal rate studies.  First, we
avoid the numerator problems in treating partial wins by looking in-
stead at final judgments.  Comparing defendants’ and plaintiffs’ judg-
ment rates, rather than just tracking defendants’ judgments,
neutralizes exogenous influences on the yearly number of judgments.
Second, we avoid the denominator problems in selecting an appropri-
ate set of motions by looking at all pretrial adjudications in all district
court cases, while coding enough variables to permit meaningful sta-
tistical analysis.  Grouping all the means of pretrial adjudication also
moots any shift from summary judgment to dismissal as the means of
disposition.  Third, by stressing the parties’ relative positions, our
measure allows us to shift the discussion of the Court’s impact from a
48 Id. at 19.
49 Id. at 23–24.
50 Engstrom had already amassed a number of those studies to support their general
thrust in favor of a single-digit Twiqbal effect on dismissal rate.  Engstrom, supra note 36, at R
1230–34.
51 See Reinert, supra note 8, at 29–30. R
52 Id. at 46.
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raising of the decision standard to a harm to the plaintiffs as a class.  It
shifts us slightly closer to answering a relevant question.
An example of the possible statistical analysis enabled by our new
measure appears as Figure 3.  It shows a competing risk regression
model, a form of survival analysis, by plotting the growing likelihood
of a dismissal having been ordered as time from filing increases.  We
look at the cases filed just before and just after the Twombly decision.
We here show only the case category of constitutional torts, choosing
it because it exhibited a less dramatic effect than did employment
cases in Figure 2.  Still, constitutional torts significantly exhibits the
anti-plaintiff effect of Twombly and, further, shows its substantially
greater impact on pro se plaintiffs going up against counseled
defendants.53
53 Hazard ratio analysis (controlling for circuit and changed docket load measured by
each district’s change in mean time to disposition in the year before and after Twombly,
and clustering standard errors by district) shows for 18,271 cases a 14% increase in the
instantaneous risk of the defendant’s winning by pretrial-adjudication judgment after
Twombly, significant at the .02 level, and a 36% increase for the 9,666 different cases with a
pro se plaintiff going up against a counseled defendant, significant at the .001 level.  The
survival analysis framework allows us to account for censored cases: those still pending as of
September 2013 and those not followed to conclusion due to transfer or remand.  How-
ever, competing risk models assume that the risks are separable and independent.  The
various methods of case disposition do not satisfy that assumption.  Accordingly, as a check
on our model, we ran a multilevel logistic regression model in which the dependent varia-
ble was whether the defendant obtained a pretrial-adjudication judgment (and in which
districts were treated as random effects).  The Twombly effects were consistent with those in
the competing risk model.
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FIGURE 3. CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S SUFFERING
PRETRIAL-ADJUDICATION JUDGMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES
FILED IN THE YEAR BEFORE OR IN THE YEAR AFTER TWOMBLY,
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C. Asking the Appropriate Question
The difficulty with all empirical work in this area is that it has not
addressed the real question, which is whether the benefit of the
Court’s procedural innovation is worth its costs.54  An affirmative an-
swer rests on satisfying this formula:
BS > CE + CD
The benefit of screening out unworthy cases early as by summary judg-
ment or dismissal, BS, includes the savings to society and to the parties
by not having to litigate the case farther plus the savings to society and
to the defendant by not eventually imposing a liability wrongfully.
The error costs, CE, include the costs to society and to the plaintiff of
throwing out worthy cases, with worthiness best read to mean cases
that should otherwise win under the system’s litigation scheme.  The
direct costs, CD, include the additional out-of-pocket costs incurred by
society and the parties in administering the new screening test.
Obviously, this formula comprises only unknowables.  With her-
culean efforts, researchers can acquire some circumstantial evidence
54 See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 469–71 (3d ed. 2012).
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on one piece of the puzzle or another.  Consider all the work on dis-
missal rate.  That measure does not even appear in the formula.  But if
the rate increases, we have tangible evidence leaning toward CE > 0,
which is rhetorically useful even if the conclusion probably was al-
ready obvious.  Still, because of the selection effect, we get no sense of
the size of cost.  So, we remain very distant from solving the formula.
Why, then, has dismissal rate received so much attention?  The
reason is that it might be the key to a trick solution of the formula.
Because intuitively BS > CD, on the idea that money saved by throwing
out cases exceeds the administrative costs of the expedited process,
one can argue that a procedural reform is desirable as long as CE = 0.
Hence, the Supreme Court’s summary judgment trilogy and Twombly-
Iqbal pleading decisions both are affirmative reforms as long as plain-
tiffs as a class do not suffer under them.  A steady dismissal rate sort of
suggests no suffering, so proponents of the Court’s decisions have lov-
ingly embraced the FJC studies and declared the debate over.
Careful analysis of the FJC data, however, confirms that CE is
likely sizable.  Our Article has established that plaintiffs are not filing
some cases that would have succeeded under the prior procedural re-
gime, plaintiffs are settling their cases on less favorable terms, and in
the aftermath of the Court’s decisions plaintiffs are losing more cases
by pretrial adjudication.
Our establishing an anti-plaintiff impact might embolden oppo-
nents of the Court’s decisions to flip the trick of solving the formula
without performing the virtually impossible task of measuring its com-
ponents.  If BS = 0, then of course the Supreme Court’s summary judg-
ment trilogy and Twombly-Iqbal pleading decisions are deleterious
innovations because CE + CD exceeds zero.  Already some research pre-
liminarily suggests that BS = 0.  Professor Reinert has shown that cases
surviving a motion to dismiss in 2010 do not have a noticeably greater
rate of plaintiffs’ ultimate success than cases surviving a motion to dis-
miss in 2006.55  Thus, he infers that Twiqbal seems not to be yielding a
stronger body of surviving cases.56  Professor Gelbach has shown the
rate of granting summary judgments to defendants in employment
discrimination and contracts cases did not significantly decline after
55 See Reinert, supra note 8, at 39. R
56 See id. at 38–42; see also Alex Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767
(2014) (arguing more generally that judges cannot deliver the benefits promised by
Twiqbal).
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Twiqbal.57  Thus, he infers that the body of surviving cases seems no
more meritorious.58
Nonetheless, we suspect that such efforts to show no benefit will
fail, for the same reasons that the FJC’s efforts have failed.  The no-
benefit findings share the shortcomings of dismissal rate studies, in-
cluding the confounding effect of selection.59  If the parties have ad-
justed to the new pleading regime, then the cases remaining in the
system will exhibit, at least after a while, the same attributes as the pre-
Twiqbal caseload.
In all likelihood, both BS and CE exceed zero, and so there is no
trick for sidestepping the formula.  The route to addressing the
formula is an arduous, but familiar, one for legal scholars.  Drawing
on what empirical research is available (e.g., on the seriousness of the
problem of nonmeritorious complaints), scholars must rely on
hunches (e.g., a pleading procedure is unlikely to screen the merits
accurately) and presumptions (e.g., deciding cases on the merits con-
stitutes a superior process) in arguing for the best procedure.  The
scholars must grapple with getting a rough sense of whether quickly
screening unworthy cases out of the system justifies the accompanying
denial of access and the difficulties of administering complicated
screening tests.60  That is, there is no avoiding the issue of whether the
benefits of the trilogy and Twiqbal exceed their costs.
CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court wanted to help out defendants through its
summary judgment trilogy and Twombly-Iqbal pleading decisions, the
data indicate that the Court has succeeded.  Whether its moves were
wise ones, however, remains an open question.
57 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Dispute over Twombly and Iqbal : Using
Defense Summary Judgment Win Rates to Measure the Quality of Cases Affected by
Heightened Pleading 2 (July 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
58 See id.; Engstrom, supra note 36, at 1207, 1235 n.99 (praising and criticizing R
Gelbach’s results).
59 Cf. Choi, Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 39, at 35–38 (conducting a matching study R
that puts in doubt the screening benefits of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
60 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 28, at 1365–70 (discussing the difficulties faced in the R
wake of Twombly-Iqbal).
